ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

REGIONS

October 2025

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Yes We Have No Revisions Today . . .

If you conduct revisions without really revising anything, have you really conducted revisions? Wait, what? Okay, fine, so it may not be one of the great questions that have stumped some of the great minds over the course of human history, but it is nonetheless one we found ourselves asking in the wake of the Bureau of Economic Analysis' (BEA) annual revisions to the data from the National Economic Accounts (NEA). The NEA provide a comprehensive view of U.S. economic activity and are the root source of the BEA's estimates of GDP, personal income, corporate profits, and a host of other series. Each year the BEA undertakes revisions to the data from the NEA, which vary in terms of scope and duration; this year's revisions cover the period from Q1 2020 through Q2 2025.

In the wake of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) release of the preliminary estimate of their annual benchmark revisions to recent estimates of nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings, many were awaiting the NEA revisions with a sense of trepidation. With the BLS's preliminary estimate showing the level of nonfarm employment as of March 2025 would be revised down by 911,000 jobs, many assumed the revisions to the NEA would show a similarly large downward revision to real GDP growth over recent quarters. Indeed, that was a question we got more than a few times ahead of the NEA revisions. Such fears were based on the premise that such a large downward revision to prior estimates of job growth and aggregate hours worked meant the economy had to have grown at a slower pace than BEA had previously reported. While we didn't dismiss that scenario out of hand, we did see it as highly unlikely. Instead, we thought any revisions to recent real GDP growth would be minor, leaving a wider gap between aggregate hours worked and real GDP growth that would be filled by labor productivity growth ultimately being revised higher.

As it turned out, the revisions to real GDP growth over the Q1 2020 through Q2 2025 period were even smaller than we anticipated. While it will be some time before the BLS releases revisions to the data on labor productivity growth, upward revisions to that series seem all but a given in light of what should be a meaningful downward revision to aggregate private sector hours worked when the BLS releases their final benchmark revisions to the data from the establishment survey in February 2026. The next section is devoted to a discussion of recent trends in productivity growth, but before we get there, we'll offer a few comments on the BEA"s revisions, such as they were, to the recent data on GDP, corporate profits, and personal income.

The following chart goes to our point about there being only minor revisions to the path of real GDP over the Q1 2020 through Q2 2025 period. On the whole, real GDP grew by more over this period than had previously been reported, but, you have to squint hard to see this in the chart. To that point, prior to the revisions, real GDP was reported to have increased by 12.95 percent over this period, while the revised data put that increase at 13.27 percent, with that modest gap reflecting ever so slightly faster growth over the most recent quarters.



To be sure, with an aggregate as broad as GDP, it is often the case that even if the headline number does not change much, there can be a significant reshuffling of the underlying details. That was not, however, the case with this round of revisions. As the following chart illustrates, there were only minor revisions to the component parts which netted out to the modestly larger increase in real GDP over the Q1 2020-Q2 2025 period than previously reported.



Consumer spending, business investment in intellectual property products and structures, and government consumption and investment outlays are all now reported to have grown a bit more than had been reported, as are imports of goods, though in this

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case that deducts from GDP growth, while business spending on equipment and machinery grew by less than had been reported.

Though uneventful on the whole, there are two points about the revisions to the NEA data we think worth making here. First, as with real GDP, we did not expect significant revisions to prior estimates of personal income in this round of NEA revisions. We did, however, specifically point to the prior estimate of Q1 2025 private sector wage and salary earnings as a potential exception. Recall that BEA ties their estimates of wage and salary earnings to the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) on an ongoing basis, rather than the once-a-year reconciliation that is the basis for the BLS's benchmark revisions to their estimates of nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings. As such, the sizable downward revision to job growth over the year ending March 2025 need not have resulted in a similar downward revision to prior estimates of wage and salary earnings.

That said, BEA's prior estimates of Q1 wage and salary earnings were made months ahead of the release of the Q1 2025 QCEW data, meaning there was some play in those estimates. Our sense was that BEA's estimates of Q1 private sector earnings were on the high side, particularly as the private sector accounts for almost all of the pending downward revision to nonfarm payrolls. That proved to be the case, with the revised data showing private sector wage and salary earnings grew at an annual rate of 5.3 percent in Q1 2025 rather than the 7.1 percent rate previously reported. To be sure, the revised data still leave a healthy gain in private sector labor earnings, and Q2 growth is now pegged at an annual rate of 5.1 percent despite a marked slowdown in the pace of job growth.



The other, and we think more relevant, element of the revisions to the NEA data is that corporate profits over the first half of 2025 were not nearly as strong as had previously been reported. This, at least for us, falls under the heading of "timing is everything," given that we devoted part of last month's *Outlook* to a discussion of elevated corporate profit margins despite businesses apparently absorbing most of the costs of higher tariffs. The chart above shows after-tax profit margins and, as can clearly be seen, the revised data show margins narrowed considerably over 1H 2025. As a reminder, we use the GDP measure of corporate profits which is most consistent with how the S&P 500 companies report profits.

It is worth noting that, as can be seen in the chart, profits grew faster between 2022 and mid-2024 than had previously been reported, meaning that margins were correspondingly wider. It is also worth noting that despite the downward revision to profit growth over 1H 2025 margins nonetheless remain easily above historical norms, just not to the extent previously reported.

What we think is more interesting, however, is what the data may say about the impact of higher tariffs. For instance, it could be that one factor behind the sharp decline in profits (both before-tax and after-tax) during Q1 2025 was the cost of building inventories ahead of anticipated increases in tariffs, i.e., firms ordering, shipping, and storing goods as they pulled orders forward to avoid tariff-related price hikes. That some tariff hikes took effect during Q1 could also help account for the decline in profits seen during the quarter. Profits basically flat-lined during Q2 despite the sharp increase in final sales, which we use as the base for our calculation of profit margins. To the extent the retail level inflation data show only limited tariff pass-through, that profits flat-lined while sales revenue spiked could in part reflect firms absorbing higher tariff costs, with the net result being further margin compression. It is also worth noting that with Q2 profits basically holding steady in Q2 after having declined sharply in Q1, that left profits well below the level seen in Q4 2024.

We will say that the paths of profits and margins shown in the revised NEA data make more sense than those previously shown. At least in the sense that they align with the story we've consistently told about how we expected firms to react to higher tariffs. Whether that story actually makes sense is a question we'll leave for others to answer. But, while we'll reiterate that even the revised data leave margins well above historical norms, the degree to which margins compressed over 1H 2025 points to what we think will be the next chapter in this story, i.e., the one in which firms become more aggressive in testing how much latitude they have to raise prices to help stem the compression in margins. We heard increasing hints of this in Q2 earnings calls, and, yes, to this point it has been more a case of "hints" than of explicit references to specific price increases. Either way, we've always argued that tariff pass-through would become more pronounced as time went by, and the downward revisions to profits and margins could simply put us closer to that point than we had thought based on what the data were saying prior to the recent revisions. While we continue to maintain that the costs of higher tariffs will be split amongst suppliers, the firms importing either finished goods or inputs to production, and final consumers, that still leaves the likelihood that margins could compress further while core inflation drifts even further above the FOMC's target rate.

Not A Miracle, At Least Not Yet

As our long-time readers know, we attach great significance to the question of how rapidly an economy can grow on a sustained basis without sparking inflation pressures, which we refer to as an economy's "speed limit." For any economy, the speed limit is a function of two factors – the rate of growth of total labor input and the rate of labor productivity growth. Productivity growth allows for wages growing over time without impinging on profit margins or igniting inflation pressures and is a particularly important ally of firms faced with labor supply constraints. As we've often noted,

productivity growth has tended to behave in a highly cyclical manner over time, with prolonged periods of faster/slower growth.

The significance we attach to an economy's "speed limit" is reflected in the frequency with which we return to this topic. That said, it's been a while, mainly because we haven't discussed productivity growth nearly as much of late as we have typically done in the past. This mainly reflects the extent to which the data on productivity were distorted by the pandemic, and while that may seem far off in the rear-view mirror, that we rely on the longer-term trends in the productivity data means it has taken considerable time to put those distortions behind us. The last time we took up the topic of productivity growth was in the January 2025 *Outlook*, our annual outlook edition, when we noted that we thought one of the most underappreciated stories of the recent past was the marked acceleration in productivity growth.

Recall that the U.S. economy grew at an almost three percent rate in both 2023 and 2024. Unlike those seemingly unaware that there is actually a supply side of the economy, we attributed that growth, well above what we consider the economy's longer-term speed limit, to the combination of exceptionally rapid labor supply growth and accelerating productivity growth. To us, that was just another illustration of an irrefutable yet widely overlooked truth, which is that the economy does not grow because consumption grows but, instead, consumption grows because the economy grows. As we looked ahead to 2025 in our January *Outlook*, we argued that sustaining that acceleration in productivity growth would be critical for the U.S. economy given what we expected would be a dramatic slowdown in labor supply growth. Absent continued acceleration in productivity growth, that slowdown in labor supply growth would yield slower real GDP growth along with either higher inflation or slimmer corporate profit margins, if not both. While the data show the pronounced drop-off in labor supply growth we anticipated, largely reflecting an outflow of foreign born labor, the jury is still out on the matter of whether, or to what extent, faster productivity growth can be sustained even as many, us included, anticipate a significant boost from AI.



The chart above illustrates several points to keep in mind in any discussion of productivity growth. First, measured productivity growth is inherently volatile from quarter to quarter, and some of that volatility remains even when trending the data. While some prefer to look at even longer terms, such as three or five year averages, as a means of getting around this issue, we've always seen an eight-quarter moving average as a reliable gauge of the underlying trends. Also, productivity growth tends to be particularly volatile around cyclical turning points, as can be seen on both sides of the 1990-91, 2007-09, and 2020 recessions, which largely reflects employment being somewhat of a lagging variable. For instance, as slowing economic growth is giving way to recession, firms tend to be slow to cut workers, such that output growth slows more than aggregate hours worked, thus pushing measured productivity growth lower. Coming out of recessions, however, firms are slower to add back workers as output growth initially picks up, thus pushing measured productivity growth higher. The pandemic induced recession of 2020, when millions of workers lost jobs as the economy shut down and then were added back in very large blocks, is an extreme illustration of this tendency, which is why we don't put much weight on the productivity data from 2020 through 2022.

It is worth noting that labor productivity growth was on a nice, albeit not at all smooth, upward trend prior to the onset of the pandemic and, as of mid-year 2025, is pretty much where it would have been had that trend not been interrupted. The dip in the eight-quarter moving average over 1H 2025 in part reflects the contraction in real nonfarm business output in Q1 2025, the same quarter in which real GDP contracted at a 0.6 percent annual rate. That said, based on the BLS's preliminary estimate of the pending downward revision to nonfarm employment, which all but locks in a corresponding downward revision to aggregate hours worked, productivity growth over recent quarters will almost surely be revised higher upon the annual revisions to the productivity data.

This goes to the point we made in our January *Outlook* about the acceleration in productivity growth being underappreciated. Most discussions of productivity growth of late have centered around the potential boost from AI, which is fine, but in many of these discussions seem premised on AI being the remedy for anemic productivity growth. The reality is that by year-end 2024, trend productivity growth had accelerated to 2.6 percent; a mid-to-late cycle acceleration in productivity growth is at odds with historical patterns, let alone an acceleration of this magnitude. We've argued that the acceleration in productivity growth that took hold prior to the pandemic was in large part firms reacting to increasingly tight labor market conditions that were leading to faster growth in labor compensation costs, thus fueling a drive for greater efficiency. We've also argued that demographic trends would lead to slower and slower growth in labor supply, making faster productivity growth an essential support for output growth and (profit) margin preservation in the years ahead.

The rapid outflow of foreign born labor seen thus far in 2025 buttresses our argument about the need for faster productivity growth. Moreover, given that business investment in equipment, software, and research and development is the fuel for faster labor productivity growth, recent changes to the tax code allowing for immediate expensing of business investment expenditures should help sustain the acceleration in productivity growth. It is more than fair to ask whether, or to what extent, the acceleration in productivity growth would be sustained absent any boost from AI, our point here is simply that the starting point from whatever contributions AI will ultimately make was a prolonged period of

accelerating productivity growth, a point almost always overlooked in discussions about the potential productivity boost from AI.

While early contributions from AI are likely playing a role in the slowing pace of job growth and thus adding to productivity growth, it is far too soon to know what AI's contribution will ultimately be. For many, the holy grail for productivity growth is the "productivity miracle," or, the ten year period from 1996 through 2005 during which productivity growth averaged 3.0 percent per year, which stands out in the chart on the prior page. That sustained boom in productivity growth was largely driven by dizzying breakthroughs in information processing and communications technology, areas in which businesses invested heavily. The sustained rapid growth in labor productivity helped fuel faster real GDP growth – which averaged 3.4 percent per year over this decade – while keeping inflation pressures in check. It is well chronicled how Alan Greenspan, at that time the Chair of the Federal Reserve, was an early believer in the "productivity miracle," which gave him comfort in arguing against the rapid increases in the Fed funds rate many other FOMC members believed warranted in the face of such rapid economic growth.



The chart above shows how the economy's speed limit changes over time as the growth rates of the underlying drivers, i.e., labor supply and labor productivity, change. The time periods delineated in the chart are not arbitrary but instead are based on productivity growth cycles. The extent to which the "productivity miracle" boosted the economy's speed limit can clearly be seen. It is worth noting that trend labor force growth slowed sharply once the sustained increase in female participation that drove overall labor force growth ran its course in the early 2000s, thus contributing to a lower speed limit. Note that we've omitted the data for 2020-2022 from the last cycle depicted in the chart, which goes to our point about the distortions in the productivity data over this span, but the acceleration in productivity growth we referred to as an underappreciated story began to take hold in 2017.

The acceleration in labor force growth apparent in the last period depicted in the chart largely reflects the surge in net international in-migration which began in 2022 and carried into late-2024, which was the primary factor behind the more rapid growth in the labor force. We have, however, already seen a pronounced slowdown in labor force growth in 2025, which we've argued is largely a function of the outflow of foreign born labor seen over the course of the year. Absent an offsetting pick-up in productivity growth, this will meaningfully reduce the economy's speed limit.

This is a point that typically goes unnoticed in discussions of how AI might impact the labor market. While many fear the prospect of humans being replaced by technology/automation, we fear the prospect of enhanced technology/automation not being able to fill in the gaps left by the marked slowdown in the pace of labor force growth which was more or less pre-ordained by demographic trends and which is now being exacerbated by the outflow of foreign born labor. This does not mean we shouldn't be concerned over the prospect of humans being replaced by technology. Indeed, we routinely make the same point about the impacts of both technology and international trade, which is that technology and trade create winners and losers, and while that on net is a benefit to the economy, we've not done a good job at tending to those who are displaced and getting their skills reoriented to the economy shaped by trade and technology. This perhaps goes a long way toward explaining the pushback against globalization seen over the past several years, but while policy makers can put up barriers to global trade it is far less clear whether, or to what extent, the barriers to the increased use of technology and automation that some are calling for can be put in place.

Absent any such barriers, it is far too soon to know the extent to which AI will boost labor productivity growth, but there is already considerable discussion/debate around whether we can see a repeat of the productivity miracle. That is obviously a high bar to clear; not only would we need to see further acceleration in labor productivity growth beyond that already in place, but the faster growth would have to be sustained over a prolonged period – the productivity miracle spanned an entire decade. There is no clear consensus, nor would you expect one at this point, but we've seen estimates of the annual boost to productivity growth from AI ranging from 0.5 percent per year to 1.5 percent per year.

There are a couple points worth keeping in mind here. First, even were we to see another decade-long run of 3.0 percent average annual labor productivity growth, that doesn't mean the economy's speed limit would be as high as was the case from 1996 through 2005. As noted above, we've already seen a pronounced slowdown in labor force growth and we expect this slower growth to persist even if at some point we see a pick-up in net international in-migration from current rates. Even the most optimistic projections of the potential contribution of AI to productivity growth do not envision such a pronounced pick-up being sustained for so long.

The demographic aspect ties into our second point, which is that even were we to see a repeat of the productivity miracle, the potential disinflationary impact of a sharp and sustained pick-up in productivity growth would likely be less powerful than many seem to be assuming. Those making such assumptions point to the pronounced disinflation seen over the 1996-2005 period to support their case, but making this simple one-to-one connection overlooks what to us are two very important points. First, the productivity miracle came amid a pronounced deceleration in inflation that spanned decades. Second, while many, including more than a few central bankers, attribute the long-term deceleration in inflation to better and more credible central banking, we think demographics,

technology, and globalization were the far more important drivers. This isn't to say better and more credible central banking did not play a role; we think it did, but just not the starring role.



The chart above illustrates our point that the sharp disinflation associated with the productivity miracle was part of a longer-term process. While we think there can be no denying the contribution made by faster productivity growth, we've also argued that both demographics and globalization played important roles. This, however, accounts for why we think many are expecting much more of a disinflationary impulse from faster productivity growth than is likely.

As discussed above, demographic trends have shifted direction, and rather than a rapidly increasing global supply of labor as seen over those earlier decades, declining birth rates and an aging population are weighing on labor force growth. It is worth noting that this is a global story, not exclusively a U.S. story. At the same time, what had been a push toward globalization has for the past several years been a pushback against globalization. Each of these effects, at least in our view, will add to rather than dampen inflation pressures. While faster productivity growth can alleviate any such inflation pressures, it would be a tall order for faster productivity growth to completely negate them.

This, by the way, is an argument we've been making for years. As far back as 2018 we were questioning whether the FOMC's 2.0 percent inflation target was still appropriate, and we pointed to a reversal in globalization and feeble demographic trends as factors in our thinking. Note that in the chart above we show average PCE inflation for the 2020s to date but also break out 2024-25 so that the worst of the post-pandemic inflation wasn't having an undue impact. Even so, with inflation easily above the FOMC's 2.0 percent target and likely, at least in the near term, to push even higher, it is reasonable to ask whether that target is still appropriate, or even realistic, absent the support from demographics and globalization seen over earlier decades.

Again, we're not doubting the contribution to be made by a sustained period of faster productivity growth but instead are simply questioning if productivity growth can really be fast enough for long enough to counter the combined inflationary impulse from feeble demographics and globalization being in retreat. It is still early in the game, and it will take years to fully understand how AI is impacting labor productivity growth. But, even a best-case scenario for productivity growth, with a repeat of the productivity miracle serving as the marker, would not necessarily ensure we see a repeat of a best-case scenario for growth and inflation.

Shutdown Corner . . .

No, we're not talking about Jalen Ramsey here, with all due apologies to those drawn to this section by that headline. Instead, just a few comments about the impact of the shutdown of the federal government, still ongoing at this writing, on the flow of economic data. With the major agencies tasked with collecting and reporting the economic data, including the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau, being shut down, publication of the regular reports produced by these and other agencies is suspended for the duration. The first major release put on hold was the September employment report originally scheduled for release on October 3.

This does not leave us totally lacking economic data during the shutdown. Privately produced reports, such as the monthly surveys by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM), the ADP's monthly read on job growth, the National Association of Realtors' monthly reports on existing home sales, and the monthly data on house prices/home sales from Cotality (CoreLogic) will still be produced and published. Moreover, the myriad of "alternative" data sources, many of which came into being during the pandemic, will still be available. Moreover, as the data are compiled by the individual states, we will still be able to access the weekly data on initial and continuing claims for unemployment insurance benefits even though the Department of Labor will not be publishing their usual weekly reports. So, it is by no means accurate to say we'll be flying blind in terms of economic data. It is, however, the case that there are no complete and perfect substitutes for the data provided by the government agencies, however imperfect some of those series may at times be. As such, we'll simply have much less visibility into the state of the U.S. economy for the duration of the shutdown, with no way of knowing how long that will be.

That said, it isn't as though having the full slate of data exactly settled the question, as assessments of the state of the economy prior to the shutdown were all over the map. Some were arguing that the economy had for some time been in recession, while others were arguing that growth was, or was on the verge of, reaccelerating. Our view was that the last batch of data we saw, including observations on consumer spending, jobless claims, and business investment showed the economy on firmer footing than many believe is the case and at the very least did not portray an economy on the verge of rolling over. We're not ignoring the pronounced slowdown in job growth, but instead see this as just as much, if not more, of a labor supply story than a labor demand story, a distinction that very much matters in terms of the impact on the broader economy. Sure, we've been accused of taking a struthious approach to assessing the state of the economy, which is probably more of an insult to the happily oblivious ostriches of the world than it is to us. Either way, our assessments of the economy have long been and still are based on the trends we see in the not seasonally adjusted data, and at least for a time we won't have most of that data. In the interim, the weekly data on jobless claims will be one of the most, if not the most, important of the data series still at our disposal.

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

REGIONS

October 2025

Q1 '25 (a)	Q2 '25 (a)	Q3 '25 (f)	Q4 '25 (f)	Q1 '26 (f)	Q2 '26 (f)	Q3 '26 (f)	Q4 '26 (f)		2022 (a)	2023 (a)	2024 (f)	2025 (f)	2026 (f)
-0.6	3.8	2.8	0.9	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.0	Real GDP[1]	2.5	2.9	2.8	1.9	2.0
0.6	2.5	3.1	1.3	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.3	Real Personal Consumption[1]	3.0	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.1
9.5	7.3	2.2	-0.4	1.0	2.2	3.5	3.9	Real Business Fixed Investment[1]	6.5	7.3	2.9	3.8	2.0
21.4	8.5	4.3	-2.6	0.5	2.0	4.2	4.4	Equipment[1]	2.8	2.9	3.5	7.7	1.9
6.5	15.0	3.6	3.5	3.5	4.0	4.6	5.0	Intellectual Property and Software[1]	11.7	6.2	3.5	5.3	4.5
-3.1	-7.5	-5.2	-4.9	-3.9	-1.8	-1.1	0.0	Structures[1]	3.5	16.7	1.1	-5.2	-3.5
-1.0	-5.1	-5.6	-4.3	-3.3	-2.5	-0.6	0.8	Real Residential Fixed Investment[1]	-8.1	-7.8	3.2	-2.1	-3.2
-1.0	-0.1	0.0	0.1	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.3	Real Government Expenditures[1]	-1.2	3.5	3.8	1.2	0.6
-1,380.7	-1,058.0	-999.4	-1,028.0	-1,033.4	-1,054.3	-1,065.0	-1,091.0	Real Net Exports[2]	-1,024.4	-925.2	-1,032.6	-1,116.5	-1,060.9
1,015	941	915	881	882	886	892	897	Single Family Housing Starts, ths. of units[3]	1,005	947	1,016	938	889
386	413	427	405	409	413	415	418	Multi-Family Housing Starts, ths. of units[3]	547	473	355	408	414
2.5	1.7	1.1	-0.2	-1.2	-1.2	-0.9	0.4	CoreLogic House Price Index[5]	12.8	4.0	4.3	1.3	-0.7
16.4	16.1	16.3	15.5	15.7	15.8	15.9	15.9	Vehicle Sales, millions of units[3]	13.8	15.5	15.8	16.1	15.8
4.1	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	Unemployment Rate, %[4]	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.4
1.2	1.0	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	Non-Farm Employment[5]	4.3	2.2	1.3	0.9	0.4
2.3	3.1	0.0	-0.3	4.3	1.1	1.3	1.6	Real Disposable Personal Income[1]	-5.7	5.7	2.9	1.8	1.7
2.6	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.3	GDP Price Deflator[5]	7.1	3.7	2.5	2.7	2.5
2.6	2.4	2.7	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.4	PCE Deflator[5]	6.5	3.8	2.6	2.7	2.7
2.7	2.5	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.3	3.1	2.8	Consumer Price Index[5]	8.0	4.1	3.0	2.8	3.0
2.8	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.4	Core PCE Deflator[5]	5.3	4.2	2.9	2.9	2.7
3.1	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.2	2.8	Core Consumer Price Index[5]	6.2	4.8	3.4	3.1	3.2
4.38	4.38	4.34	3.95	3.66	3.38	3.38	3.38	Fed Funds Target Rate Range Mid-Point, %[4]	1.73	5.07	5.19	4.26	3.45
4.45	4.36	4.26	4.18	4.25	4.33	4.36	4.43	10-Year Treasury Note Yield, %[4]	2.95	3.96	4.21	4.31	4.34
6.83	6.79	6.57	6.40	6.42	6.45	6.45	6.50	30-Year Fixed Mortgage, %[4]	5.34	6.81	6.72	6.65	6.45
-5.9	-3.3	-3.5	-3.8	-3.7	-3.6	-3.5	-3.5	Current Account, % of GDP	-3.8	-3.3	-4.0	-3.9	-3.6

a = actual; f = forecast; p = preliminary

Notes: 1 - annualized percentage change 2 - chained 2017 $ billions 3 - annualized rate 4 - quarterly average 5 - year-over-year percentage change

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